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Abstract
In his seminal paper on arbitrage and competitive equilibrium in
unbounded exchange economies, Werner (Econometrica, 1987) proved
the existence of a competitive equilibrium, under a price no-arbitrage
condition, without assuming either local or global nonsatiation. Werner’s
existence result contrasts sharply with classical existence results for
bounded exchange economies which require, at minimum, global non-
satiation at rational allocations. Why do unbounded exchange economies
admit existence without local or global nonsatiation? This question is
the focus of our paper. We make two main contributions to the theory
of arbitrage and competitive equilibrium. First, we show that, in gen-
eral, in unbounded exchange economies (for example, asset exchange
1economies allowing short sales), even if some agents’ preferences are
satiated, the absence of arbitrage is suﬃcient for the existence of com-
petitive equilibria, as long as each agent who is satiated has a non-
empty set of useful net trades - that is, as long as agents’ preferences
satisfy weak nonsatiation. Second, we provide a new approach to prov-
ing existence in unbounded exchange economies. The key step in our
new approach is to transform the original economy to an economy sat-
isfying global nonsatiation such that all equilibria of the transformed
economy are equilibria of the original economy. What our approach
makes clear is that it is precisely the condition of weak nonsatiation
- a condition considerably weaker than local or global nonsatiation -
that makes possible this transformation. Moreover, as we show via
examples, without weak nonsatiation, existence fails.
Keywords: Arbitrage, Asset Market Equilibrium, Nonsatiation,
Recession Cones.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C 62, D 50.
21 Introduction
Since the pioneering contributions of Grandmont ((1970), (1972), (1977)),
Green (1973), and Hart (1974), the relationship between arbitrage and equi-
librium in asset exchange economies allowing short sales has been the sub-
ject of much investigation1. When unlimited short sales are allowed, agents’
choice sets are unbounded from below. As a consequence, asset prices at
which agents can exhaust all gains from trade via mutually compatible net
trades bounded in size may fail to exist. By assuming that markets admit
“no arbitrage”, the economy can be bounded endogenously -b u tt h i si sn o t
enough for existence. In addition to no-arbitrage conditions, two other con-
ditions are frequently required: (i) uniformity of arbitrage opportunities,2
and (ii) nonsatiation. Werner, in his seminal 1987 paper on arbitrage and
competitive equilibrium, assumes uniformity of arbitrage opportunities and
establishes the existence of a competitive equilibrium using a no-arbitrage
condition on prices. An especially intriguing aspect of Werner’s existence
result is that it does not require local or global nonsatiation (see Werner
(1987), Theorems 1).3 This contrasts sharply with classical existence results
for bounded exchange economies which require, at minimum, that agents’
preferences be globally nonsatiated at rational allocations (e.g., see Debreu
(1959), Gale and Mas-Colell (1975), and Bergstrom (1976)).4 Why do un-
bounded exchange economies admit existence without local or global nonsa-
tiation? This question is the focus of our paper.
Our starting point is Werner’s notion of useful net trades. Stated infor-
mally, a useful net trade is a net trade that, for some endowments, represents
1See also, for example, Milne (1976, 1980), Hammond (1983), Page (1987), Nielsen
(1989), Page and Wooders (1996), Kim (1998), Dana, Le Van, Magnien (1999), Allouch
(1999), and Page, Wooders, and Monteiro (2000).
2A vector of net trades y is said to be an arbitrage opportunity for agent i at x if
starting at any xI weakly preferred to x, xI+λy is also weakly preferred to x for all λ ≥ 0.
If for each agent i an arbitrage opportunity y at x is also an arbitrage opportunity at any
other xII, then uniformity holds (i.e., there is uniformity of arbitrage opportunities).
3Werner proves two existence results. In Theorem 1, each agent’s choice set (or con-
sumption set) is a closed, convex (not necessarily bounded) subset of Rl. In Theorem 2,
each agent’s choice set is a closed, convex, bounded-from-below subset of Rl.
4A rational allocation is an allocation such that each agent weakly prefers his piece of
the allocation to his endowment.
3a potential arbitrage.5 Our main contribution is to show that, in general, in
unbounded exchange economies (for example, asset exchange economies al-
lowing short sales), even if some agents’ preferences are satiated, the absence
of market arbitrage is suﬃcient for the existence of competitive equilibria, as
long as each agent who is satiated has a nonempty set of useful net trades -
that is, as long as agents’ preferences satisfy weak nonsatiation.
Our second contribution is to provide a new approach to proving exis-
tence in unbounded exchange economies. In addition to being a technical
innovation, our new approach makes clear the critical role played by un-
boundedness and weak nonsatiation in establishing existence in unbounded
exchange economies where neither local nor global nonsatiation is satisﬁed.
The key step in our new approach is a transformation of the original economy
to a new economy satisfying global nonsatiation and having the property that
all equilibria of the transformed economy are equilibria of the original econ-
omy. Existence for the transformed economy is then deduced using classical
methods. It is precisely the condition of weak nonsatiation - a condition con-
siderably weaker than local or global nonsatiation - that makes possible the
transformation of the original economy to an equivalent economy satisfying
global nonsatiation - even if the original economy fails to satisfy either local
or global nonsatiation. Moreover, as we show via examples, without weak
nonsatiation, existence fails.
In their classic paper on abstract exchange economies, Gale and Mas-
Colell (1975) establish existence by transforming an exchange economy sat-
isfying global nonsatiation to an exchange economy satisfying local nonsatia-
tion. However, if global nonsatiation fails, then the Gale/Mas-Colell trans-
formation cannot be applied. Here, we establish existence by transforming an
exchange economy satisfying weak nonsatiation (in which global nonsatiation
may fail) to an exchange economy satisfying global nonsatiation. Thus, while
our transformation is similar in motivation to the Gale/Mas-Colell transfor-
mation, it goes beyond the Gale/Mas-Colell transformation by addressing
the problem of global satiation.
5In order to formally deﬁne the notion of useful net trades, we must ﬁrst deﬁne the
notion of useless net trades. A vector of net trades y is said to be useless to agent i at x if
agent i starting at x is indiﬀerent to trading in the y or −y directions on any scale. Thus,
a vector of net trades y is useless to agent i at x if the agent is indiﬀerent along the line
x +λy, λ ∈ (−∞,+∞). A vector of net trades y is said to be useful to agent i at x if y is
an arbitrage opportunity for agent i at x and if y is not useless to agent i at x.
4As a prerequisite to proving existence in an exchange economy satisfying
weak nonsatiation only, we must extend Werner’s price no-arbitrage con-
dition to allow for weak nonsatiation - and in particular, to allow for the
possibility that some agents have empty sets of useful net trades at some
rational allocations.6 A third contribution of our paper is to show that this
extended price no-arbitrage condition is equivalent to Hart’s (1974) weak
no-market-arbitrage condition.
In addition to extending Werner’s price no-arbitrage condition and show-
ing its equivalence to Hart’s condition, we also extend Werner’s model of
an unbounded exchange economy in two ways. First, we weaken Werner’s
uniformity of arbitrage condition by assuming only uniformity of useless net
trades (see Werner (1987), Assumption A3). We refer to our uniformity
condition as weak uniformity.7 Second, in our model we require only that
agents’ utility functions be upper semicontinuous, rather than continuous as
in Werner (1987).
We shall proceed as follows: In Section 2, we present the basic ingredi-
ents of our model, including the notions of arbitrage, useful and useless net
trades, weak uniformity, and weak nonsatiation. In Section 3, we discuss the
weak no-market-arbitrage condition of Hart (1974) and the price no-arbitrage
condition of Werner (1987), and we extend Werner’s price no-arbitrage con-
dition to allow for weak nonsatiation. We then present our ﬁrst Theorem
which states that the extended price no-arbitrage condition is equivalent to
Hart’s weak no-market-arbitrage condition. In Section 4, we present our
second Theorem which states that in an unbounded exchange economy (for
example, in an asset exchange economy allowing short sales), if weak uni-
formity and weak nonsatiation hold, then the extended price no-arbitrage
condition is suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of a quasi-equilibrium - and
therefore is suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium
under the usual relative interiority conditions on endowments. In Section 5,
we present two examples which show that our weak nonsatiation assumption
6Werner’s price no-arbitrage condition requires that each agent have a nonempty set of
useful net trades. However, under weak nonsatiation, an agent is allowed to have an empty
set of useful net trades at some rational allocations - provided the agent’s preferences are
globally nonsatiated at such rational allocations.
7Thus, weak uniformity holds if for each agent i, an arbitrage opportunity y at xI that
is useless at xI,f o rxI weakly preferred to the agent’s endowment, is also useless at any
other xII weakly preferred to the agent’s endowment.
5is the weakest possible - without weak nonsatiation, existence fails. Finally,
in Section 6, the Appendix, we present the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. We
preface our proof of Theorem 1 with a detailed discussion of the geometry of
Hart’s weak no-market-arbitrage condition. In the proof of Theorem 2, we
present our new approach.
62 The Model
We consider an economy E =( Xi,u i,e i)m
i=1 with m agents and l goods.
Agent i has consumption set Xi ⊂Rl, utility function ui(·), and endowment
ei.A g e n ti s preferred set at xi ∈ Xi is
Pi(xi)={x ∈ Xi | ui(x) >u i(xi)},
while the weakly preferred set at xi is
  Pi(xi)={x ∈ Xi | ui(x) ≥ ui(xi)}.
The set of individually rational allocations is given by









ei and xi ∈   Pi(ei),∀i}.
We shall denote by Ai the projection of A onto Xi.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (a) A rational allocation x∗ ∈ A together with a nonzero
vector of prices p∗ ∈Rl is an equilibrium for the economy E
(i) if for each agent i and x ∈ Xi, ui(x) >u i(x∗
i) implies p∗·x>p ∗·ei, and
(ii) if for each agent i, p∗ · x∗
i = p∗ · ei.
(b) A rational allocation x∗ ∈ A and a nonzero price vector p∗ ∈Rl is a
quasi-equilibrium
(i) if for each agent i and x ∈ Xi, ui(x) >u i(x∗
i) implies p∗·x ≥ p∗·ei, and
(ii) if for each agent i, p∗ · x∗
i = p∗ · ei.
Given (x∗,p ∗) a quasi-equilibrium, it is well-known that if for each agent
i, (a) p∗ · x<p ∗ · ei for some x ∈ Xi and (b) Pi(x∗
i) is relatively open in Xi,
then (x∗,p ∗) is an equilibrium. Conditions (a) and (b) will be satisﬁed if,
for example, for each agent i, ei ∈ intXi, and ui is continuous on Xi. Using
irreducibility assumptions, one can also show that a quasi-equilibrium is an
equilibrium.
We now introduce our ﬁrst two assumptions: for agents i =1 ,2,...,m,
7[A.1] Xi is closed and convex with ei ∈ Xi,
[A.2] ui is upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave.
Under these two assumptions, the weak preferred set   Pi(xi)i sc o n v e xa n d
closed for xi ∈ Xi.
2.1 Arbitrage, Uniformity, and Nonsatiation
2.1.1 Arbitrage
We deﬁne the ith agent’s arbitrage cone at xi ∈ Xi as the closed convex cone
containing the origin given by
O
+   Pi(xi)={yi ∈ R
l | ∀x
 
i ∈   Pi(xi)a n dλ ≥ 0,x
 
i + λyi ∈   Pi(xi)}.
Thus, if yi ∈ O+   Pi(xi), then for all λ ≥ 0a n da l lx 
i ∈   Pi(xi), x 
i+λyi ∈ Xi and
ui(x 
i +λyi) ≥ ui(xi). The agent’s arbitrage cone at xi, then, is the recession
cone corresponding to the weakly preferred set   Pi(xi) (see Rockafellar (1970),
Section 8).8 If the agent’s utility function, ui(·), is concave, then for any
xi ∈ Xi, x 
i ∈   Pi(xi), and yi ∈ O+   Pi(xi),u i(x 
i + λyi) is nondecreasing in
λ ≥ 0. Thus, starting at any x 
i ∈   Pi(xi), trading in the yi d i r e c t i o no na n y
scale is utility nondecreasing. Moreover, if ui(·), is strictly concave, then for
any xi ∈ Xi, x 
i ∈   Pi(xi), and nonzero yi ∈ O+   Pi(xi),u i(x 
i+λyi)i si n c r e a s i n g
in λ ≥ 0. Thus for ui(·) is strictly concave, starting at any x 
i ∈   Pi(xi), trading
in the yi direction (yi  =0 )o na n ys c a l eλ ≥ 0 is utility increasing.
2.1.2 Uniformity
A set closely related to the ith agent’s arbitrage cone is the lineality space,




i ∈   Pi(xi)a n d∀λ ∈ R, x
 
i + λyi ∈   Pi(xi)}.
The set Li(xi) consists of the zero vector and all the nonzero vectors yi such
that for each x 
i weakly preferred to xi (i.e., x 
i ∈   Pi(xi)), any vector zi on
8Equivalently, yi ∈ O+   Pi(xi) if and only if yi is a cluster point of some sequence
{λkxk
i }k where the sequence of positive numbers {λk}k is such that λk ↓ 0, and where for
all k, xk
i ∈   Pi(xi); (see Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 8.2).
8the line through x 
i in the direction yi,z i = x 
i +λyi, is also weakly preferred
to xi (i.e., zi = x 
i + λyi ∈   Pi(xi)). The set Li(xi) is a closed subspace of
Rl, and is the largest subspace contained in the arbitrage cone O+   Pi(xi)( s e e
Rockafellar (1970)).
If for all agents, the lineality space Li(xi)i st h es a m ef o ra l lxi ∈   Pi(ei),
then we say that the economy satisﬁes weak uniformity. W ef o r m a l i z et h i s
notion of uniformity in the following assumption:
[A.3][Weak Uniformity] for all agents i
Li(xi)=Li(ei)f o ra l lxi ∈   Pi(ei).
Under weak uniformity, we have for all xi ∈   Pi(ei)a n da l lyi ∈ Li(ei),
ui(xi + yi) ≤ ui(xi + yi − yi) ≤ ui(xi + yi).
Thus, for all xi ∈   Pi(ei)a n da l lyi ∈ Li(ei),
ui(xi + yi)=ui(xi).
Following the terminology of Werner (1987), we refer to arbitrage opportu-
nities yi ∈ O+   Pi(xi) such that
ui(xi + λyi)=ui(xi)f o ra l lλ ∈ (−∞,∞)
as useless at xi. Thus, under weak uniformity, the ith agent’s lineality space
at his endowment, Li(ei), is equal to the set of all net trades that are useless.
Moreover, under weak uniformity the set of useful net trades at xi is given
by
O
+   Pi(xi)\Li(xi)=O
+   Pi(xi)\Li(ei).
Werner (1987) makes a uniformity assumption stronger than our assump-
tion of uniformity of useless net trades (i.e., stronger than our assumption
of weak uniformity, [A.3]). In particular, Werner assumes that all arbitrage
opportunities are uniform. Stated formally,
[Uniformity] for all agents i
O+   Pi(xi)=O+   Pi(ei)f o ra l lxi ∈   Pi(ei).
If agents have concave utility functions, then Werner’s uniformity assump-
tion, and therefore weak uniformity, is satisﬁed automatically.
For notational simplicity, we will denote each agent’s arbitrage cone and
lineality space at endowments in a special way. In particular, we will let
Ri := O
+   Pi(ei), and Li := L(ei).
92.1.3 Nonsatiation
We begin by recalling the classical notions of global and local nonsatiation:
[GlobalNonsatiation] for all agents i,
Pi(xi)  = ∅ for all xi ∈ Ai;
[LocalNonsatiation] for all agents i,
Pi(xi)  = ∅ and clPi(xi)=   Pi(xi)f o ra l lxi ∈ Ai.
Here, cl denotes closure. Werner assumes uniformity and then, rather than
assume global or local nonsatiation, assumes that
[Werner Nonsatiation] for all agents i
Ri\Li  = ∅.
This assumption is weaker than the classical assumptions. We will weaken
Werner’s nonsatiation assumption as follows:
[A.4][Weak Nonsatiation] for all agents i
∀xi ∈ Ai, if Pi(xi)=∅, then O+   Pi(xi) \ Li(xi)  = ∅.
Note that weak nonsatiation holds if global nonsatiation, local nonsatiation,
or Werner nonsatiation holds. Also, note that under weak nonsatiation if
xi ∈ Ai is a satiation point for agent i, then, as in Werner, there is a useful
net trade vector yi such that ui(xi+λyi)=ui(xi) for all λ ≥ 0. Thus, if there
are satiation points, then the set of satiation points must be unbounded.
2.1.4 An Example: The Arbitrage Cone and the Classical Notion
of Arbitrage from Finance
Here we give an example from portfolio theory to illustrate our arbitrage cone
and our notion of arbitrage and to illustrate how our notion of arbitrage is
related to the classical notion of arbitrage found in the ﬁnance literature.
Consider an agent who seeks to form a portfolio x =( x1,...,x l)o fl risky
assets so as to maximize his expected utility given by
ui(x)=
 
Rl vi( x,r )dFi(r).
10Letting xj denote the number of (perfectly divisible) shares of asset j in
portfolio x,a n drj denote the return on asset j, i.e., the jth component of
the asset return vector r ∈ Rl, expression




denotes the return on portfolio x g i v e na s s e tr e t u r nv e c t o r˙ r. Here, the
function
vi(·):R → R
is the ith agent’s utility function deﬁned over end-of-period wealth, while
Fi(·)i st h eith agent’s subjective probability beliefs concerning end-of-period
asset returns.
Assume now that






si(−): =l i m c→−∞
dvi(c)
dc ,
and for simplicity, assume that
the asset return distribution Fi(·) has bounded support, denoted by S[Fi],
contained in the nonnegative orthant Rl
+.
It follows from Proposition 2 in Bertsekas (1974) that for the expected
utility function above, a vector of net trades y ∈ Rl i sc o n t a i n e di nt h e












si(−) is an asymptotic measure of risk tolerance,
U(y): =
 
r ∈ Rl :  y,r ≥0
 




r ∈ Rl :  y,r  < 0
 





with si = 1 indicating the highest level of asymptotic risk tolerance and
si = 0 indicating the lowest level of asymptotic risk tolerance. Given that
the utility function, vi(·), is concave, si = 1 implies that the agent is risk
neutral, while si = 0 implies that the agent is risk averse. Thus, for the
expected utility function above,
O










 y,r dFi(r) ≥ 0
 
.
In words, a vector of net trades y ∈ Rl is contained in the arbitrage cone
O+   Pi(xi) if and only if the sum of the expected upside return
 
U(y)  y,r dFi(r),
discounted by the asymptotic measure of risk tolerance, and expected down-
side return
 
D(y)  y,r dFi(r) is nonnegative.
Because the expected utility function is concave, we have for all xi ∈ Xi,
x 







i + λyi,r )dFi(r)
nondecreasing in λ ≥ 0. Moreover, if the utility function vi(·)i ss t r i c t l y
concave and if the smallest subspace containing the support of the asset
return distribution Fi(·)i sRl (i.e., if there are no perfectly correlated asset
returns), then we have for all xi ∈ Xi, x 







i + λyi,r )dFi(r)
strictly increasing in λ ≥ 0.










 y,r dFi(r) ≥ 0
 
,
is independent of the portfolio xi at which the net trading starts. Thus, in this
example, uniformity - and hence weak uniformity - are satisﬁed. Moreover,
12note that a vector of net trades yi can be contained in the arbitrage cone
O+   Pi(xi) even though net trades yi involve some downside risk; that is, even
though
 
D(yi) dFi(r) > 0. Thus, our notion of arbitrage is broader than the
classical notion of arbitrage found in the ﬁn a n c el i t e r a t u r e( s e ef o re x a m p l e
Ross (1976)). In particular, within the context of the portfolio model outlined
above, our notion of arbitrage can be thought of as a notion which includes
risky arbitrage. Under the classical notion, a vector of net trades yi is a
potential arbitrage if and only if the downside risk is zero; that is, if and only
if
 
D(yi) dFi(r) = 0. Note, however, that if the agent’s asymptotic measure of
risk tolerance, si, is equal to zero, then our arbitrage cone reduces to
O

















Herein lies the connection between our notion of arbitrage and the classical
notion of arbitrage: the classical notion of arbitrage corresponds to our notion
of risky arbitrage for an agent with asymptotic measure of risk tolerance, si,
is equal to zero.
A ﬁnal observation before moving on. In this example, the lineality space,
Li,i sg i v e nb y
Li = {y ∈ R
l |  y,r  =0∀r ∈ S[Fi]}.
Thus, if the smallest subspace containing S[Fi] (the support of the asset
return distribution Fi(·)) is Rl (i.e., if there are no perfectly correlated asset
returns), then
Li = {0 }.
On the other hand, if there are perfectly correlated assets, and therefore, if
the smallest subspace containing S[Fi]i saproper subset of Rl, then there
exists nonzero net trade vectors y such that  y,r  =0f o ra l lr ∈ S[Fi]. In
the terminology of Werner (1987), such net trades are useless.
133 The No-Arbitrage Conditions of Hart and
Werner
Hart’s (1974) no-arbitrage condition is a condition on net trades. In par-
ticular, Hart’s condition requires that all mutually compatible arbitrage op-
portunities be useless.9 We shall refer to Hart’s condition as the weak no-
market-arbitrage condition (WNMA). We have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.1 The economy E satisﬁes the WNMA condition if
 m
i=1 yi =0and yi ∈ Ri for all i,t h e n
yi ∈ Li for all i.
Werner’s (1987) no-arbitrage condition is a condition on prices. In par-
ticular, Werner’s condition requires that there be a nonempty set of prices
such that each price in this set assigns a strictly positive value to any vector
of useful net trades belonging to any agent.10 We shall refer to Werner’s
condition as the price no-arbitrage condition (PNA). We have the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.2 In an economy E satisfying [Werner Nonsatiation],W e r n e r ’ s





i  = ∅,
9Hart’s condition is stated within the context of an asset exchange economy model
where uncertainty concerning asset returns is speciﬁed via a joint probability distribution
function. Page (1987) shows that in an asset exchange economy, if there are no per-
fectly correlated assets, then Hart’s condition and Page’s (1987) no-unbounded-arbitrage
condition are equivalent.
10Translating Werner’s condition to an asset exchange economy, it is easy to show that
if there are no perfectly correlated assets and if agents are suﬃciently risk averse, then
Werner’s condition is equivalent to Hammond’s overlapping expectation condition. Page
(1987) shows that in an asset exchange economy if there are no perfectly correlated as-
sets and if agents are suﬃciently risk averse, then Hammond’s overlapping expectations
condition and Page’s no-unbounded-arbitrage condition are equivalent. Thus, in an asset
exchange economy with no perfectly correlated assets populated by suﬃciently risk averse





i = {p ∈ R
  | p · y>0,∀y ∈ Ri \ Li}
is Werner’s cone of no-arbitrage prices.
Here we extend Werner’s condition to allow for the possibility that for
some agent the set of useful net trades is empty - that is, to allow for the
possibility that for some agent, Ri\Li = ∅. More importantly, we shall prove,
under very mild conditions, that our extended version of Werner’s condition
is equivalent to Hart’s condition. This result extends an earlier result by
Page, Wooders, and Monteiro (2000) on the equivalence of the Hart and
Werner conditions.
We begin by extending the deﬁnition of Werner’s cone of no-arbitrage
prices:




i if Ri \ Li  = ∅,
L⊥
i if Ri \ Li = ∅.
Given this expanded deﬁnition of the no-arbitrage-price cone, the ex-
tended price no-arbitrage condition (EPNA) is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.4 The economy E satisﬁes the EPNA condition if
m  
i=1
Si  = ∅.
Remark Note that if the economy E satisﬁes Werner’s nonsatiation condi-
tion, i.e., Ri \ Li  = ∅, ∀i, then the EPNA condition given in Deﬁnition 3.4
above reduces to Werner’s original condition PNA given in Deﬁnition 3.2.
Page, Wooders and Monteiro (2000) show that under assumptions [A.1]-
[A.2], [Uniformity] and [Werner Nonsatiation], WNMA holds if and only if
 m
i=1 SW
i  = ∅ (i.e., Hart’s condition holds if and only if Werner’s condition
holds). Here, we extend this result by proving, under [A.1]-[A.2] only, that
WNMA holds if and only if
 m
i=1 Si  = ∅.
15Theorem 3.1 Let E =( Xi,u i,e i)m
i=1 be an economy satisfying [A.1]-[A.2].
The following statements are equivalent:
1. E satisﬁes WNMA.
2. E satisﬁes EPNA.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 The Existence of Equilibrium
Our next result extends Werner’s (1987) main result on arbitrage and the
existence of equilibrium in two ways:
(1) Werner assumes uniformity of arbitrage opportunities. Here, we assume
only weak uniformity of agents’ lineality spaces [A.3].
(3) Werner assumes that for each agent i, O+   Pi(xi) \ Li(xi)  = ∅, ∀xi ∈ Xi.
Here, we weaken Werner’s nonsatiation assumption to allow O+   Pi(xi)=
Li(xi) for some agents i and some xi ∈ Ai. But in this case we require
that Pi(xi)  = ∅. In particular, we require only weak nonsatiation [A.4].
Theorem 4.1 Let E =( Xi,u i,e i)m
i=1 be an economy satisfying [A.1]-[A.2],
weak uniformity [A.3], and weak nonsatiation [A.4]. If E satisﬁes Hart’s con-
dition, WNMA, or equivalently, if E satisﬁes the extended Werner condition,
EPNA,t h e nE has a quasi-equilibrium.
Moreover, if (x∗
1,...,x ∗
m,p ∗) is a quasi-equilibrium of E such that for each
agent i,
1. infx∈Xi  x,p  <  ωi,p , and
2. Pi(x∗
i) is relatively open in Xi,
then (x∗
1,...,x ∗
m,p ∗) is an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
In addition to extending Werner (1987), we also introduce a new method
for proving existence in exchange economies with short selling. In particular,
16we prove existence by ﬁrst transforming the economy E to an economy E 
satisfying global nonsatiation and having the property that any equilibrium
of E  is an equilibrium of E. We accomplish via a modiﬁcation of agents’
utility functions. Our assumption of weak nonsatiation is crucial - it allows us
to modify agents’ utility functions in precisely the right way. We then prove
existence for the modiﬁed economy E  using the excess demand approach via
the Gale-Nikaido-Debreu Lemma.
5E x a m p l e s
Weak nonsatiation [A.4] plays a critical role in our proof of existence. In
this section, we present two examples which show that our weak nonsatiation
assumption is the weakest possible. In example 1, the economy fails to satisfy
global nonsatiation and also fails to satisfy Werner nonsatiation. However,
the economy does satisfy weak nonsatiation, as well as all the assumptions of
our Theorem4.1 - and there exists a quasi-equilibrium. In example 2, all the
assumptions of Theorem4.1 are satisﬁed except weak nonsatiation [A.4] and
existence fails. In both examples, as in Werner (1987), there is uniformity of
arbitrage opportunities.
Example 1
Consider an economy with 2 agents and 2 goods. Agent 1 has consump-
tion set X1 =[ 0 ,1]×R and endowment e1 =( 1






x11, if x11∈ [0, 1
4],
1




4, if x11∈ [1
2,1].
For agent 1, Werner nonsatiation fails because R1 = L1 = {0}×R. Moreover,
for agent 1






,x 21 ∈ R}.
Thus, global nonsatiation is satisﬁed - and thus for agent 1 weak nonsatiation
is satisﬁed.
Agent 2 has consumption set X2 =R+×R and endowment e2 =( 1
4,0).
17Agent 2’s utility function is given by
u2(x12,x 22)
  √
x12 if x12∈ [0, 1
16],
1
4 if x12≥ 1
16.
For agent 2, global nonsatiation fails because






,x 22 ∈ R}.
Moreover, for agent 2 the arbitrage cone is R2 =R+×R, w h i l et h es p a c eo f
useless net trades (i.e., the lineality space) is given by L2 = {0}×R. Thus,
for agent 2 Werner nonsatiation is satisﬁed - and thus for agent 2 weak
nonsatiation is satisﬁed.




























In this example, again there are two agents and two goods, but agent 1’s
preferences do not satisfy assumption [A.4], weak nonsatiation.
Agent 1 has consumption set X1 =[ 0 ,1]×R and endowment e1 =( 1
4,0).
But now agent 1’s utility function is given by u1(x11,x 21)=−x11. As in our
ﬁrst example, Werner nonsatiation fails for agent 1. In particular, agent 1’s
arbitrage cone is R1 = L1 = {0}×R. Thus, for agent 1, the arbitrage cone is
equal to the space of useless net trades (i.e., the lineality space).
Agent 2 has consumption set X2 =R+×R and endowment e2 =( 1
4,0).
Agent 2’s utility function is given by u2(x12,x 22)=x12. For agent 2, the
arbitrage cone is R2 =R+×R, while the space of useless net trades (i.e., the
lineality space) is given by L2 = {0}×R.
It is easy to see that Hart’s condition (WNMA) is satisﬁed. It is also easy
to check that for agent 1
A1 = {(x11,x 21) | 0 ≤ x11 ≤
1
4
,x 21 ∈ R}.
18B u tn o t et h a tf o ra g e n t1 , global nonsatiation fails at (0,x 21) ∈ A1, for all
x21 ∈ R. Thus, since for agent 1,R 1 = L1 = {0}×R, weak nonsatiation [A.4]
fails for agent 1, and thus in this example weak nonsatiation does not hold.
Does there exist an equilibrium?
In this economy, for each agent i, ei ∈ intXi and utility functions are
continuous. Hence any quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium. Moreover, if an
equilibrium exists, it must be the case that p∗ =( 1 ,0). Given p∗, agent 1’s
choice problem is given by
max{u1(x11,x 21) | x11 ∈ [0,
1
4
],x 21 ∈ R}.






21 ∈ R.G i v e np∗, agent 2’s choice problem is given by
max{u2(x12,x 22) | x12 ∈ [0,
1
4
],x 22 ∈ R}.







22 ∈ R.B u tx∗
1 + x∗
2  = e1 + e2 =( 1
2,0). Thus, in this example
weak nonsatiation fails and there does not exist a quasi-equilibrium.
6 Appendix
6.1 The Geometry of Hart’s Condition
In order to better understand the weak-no-market-arbitrage condition, let us
consider the basic geometry underlying the condition. To begin, let L⊥
i :=
L⊥
i (ei) denote the space orthogonal to agent i s lineality space Li := Li(ei).
Recall that under weak uniformity, Li is the ith agent’s set of useless net
trades. The vector space Rl can be decomposed into the direct sum of the
lineality space Li and its orthogonal complement, L⊥





and thus, each vector x ∈Rl has a unique representation as the sum of two
vectors, one from Li and one from L⊥
i . In particular, for each x ∈Rl, there
exists uniquely two vectors, y ∈ L⊥
i and z ∈ Li, such that x = y+z. Now let
A






19For each rational allocation x =( x1,...,x m) there exists uniquely two m-
tuples, y =( y1,...,y m) ∈ A⊥ and z =( z1,...,z m) ∈
 m
i=1 Li, such that
x = y + z. Thus, we can think of each rational allocation as being uniquely
decomposable into a potentially useful component and a potentially useless
component. Our ﬁrst result, a lemma, tells us that Hart’s condition holds if
and only if the set A⊥ of all useful components of the set of rational allocation
is compact. We will use this lemma in our proof of existence.
Lemma 6.1 Let E =( Xi,u i,e i)m
i=1 be an economy satisfying [A.1]-[A.2].T h e
following statements are equivalent:
1. The set A⊥ is compact.
2. E satisﬁes Hart’s condition, weak-no-market-arbitrage.
Proof. First, we will show that A⊥ is closed. For any xi ∈   Pi(ei), write
xi = x⊥
i +   xi for x⊥
i ∈   Pi(ei)∩L⊥
i and   xi ∈ Li. Let {(x⊥n
i )}n be a sequence in
A⊥ such that limn→+∞(x⊥n
i )=( x⊥































i=1 Li is a ﬁnite dimensional subspace and hence closed. Now write
ζ =
 m
i=1 ζi, where for each i, ζi ∈ Li. One can check that for each i,
x
⊥




i + ζi) ∈ A.
Hence (x⊥
i ) ∈ A⊥.
(1) ⇒ (2) : Let y =( y1,...,y m)b es u c ht h a tyi ∈ Ri for all i and
 m
i=1 yi =0 . For each i, write
yi =   yi + y⊥




ei =   ei + e⊥













⊥ for all λ ≥ 0.
20If A⊥ is bounded, we must have y⊥
i =0f o ra l li. Thus yi ∈ Li for all i.
(2) ⇒ (1) : In order to show that Hart’s condition implies that A⊥ is
compact, it suﬃces to show that Hart’s condition implies that A⊥ is bounded.
Suppose not. Let {(x⊥n
i )}n be a sequence in A⊥ such that such that
m  
i=1
     x
⊥n
i
      →∞ .
Now let {(  xn
i )}n be a sequence in
 m



















     x⊥n
i
      +  
 m










     x⊥n
i
      +  
 m










i  + 
 m
i=1  xn
i   ∈
 m
















Since for all i, x∗
i + ζi ∈ Ri, by Hart’s condition, we have x∗
i + ζi ∈ Li for all
i. Since ζi ∈ Li,x ∗
i +ζi ∈ Li implies that x∗
i ∈ Li.B u tx∗
i ∈ L⊥
i . Thus, for all
i, x∗
i =0 , so that
 m
i=1 ζi =0 . Observe that for all n,
 m
i=1
     x⊥n
i
     
 m
i=1
     x⊥n
i
      +  
 m









     x⊥n
i
      +  
 m













          =1 .
T h u s ,w eh a v eac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
216.2 The Equivalence of the Hart’s Condition and the
Generalized Werner Condition
In order to prove the equivalence of Hart (WNMA) and the extended Werner
condition (EPNA), we need two additional results.
Lemma 6.2 Let E =( Xi,u i,e i)m
i=1 be an economy satisfying [A.1]-[A.2].T h e
following statements are true:
1. For any i, such that Ri \ Li  = ∅, we have:
Si = {p ∈ L
⊥
i | p.y > 0,∀y ∈ (Ri ∩ L
⊥
i ) \{ 0}}.
2. ∀i =1 ,...,m,S i = −ri(R0
i) where (R0
i) is the polar cone of Ri,a n d
ri denotes relative interior (i.e., the interior relative to the aﬃne hull,
aﬀ(R0
i)).
Proof. (1) See Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1999, p.182).
(2) It is clear that if Ri = Li then R0
i = L⊥
i = Si. Thus, Si =r i ( −Ri
0).
Now let us suppose that Ri \ Li  = ∅. First, we show that aﬀ(R0
i)=L⊥
i .
Indeed, since Li ⊂ Ri we have R0
i ⊂ L⊥




i) is a proper vector subspace of L⊥
i , then Li is a proper vector
subspace of (aﬀ(R0
i))⊥. But (aﬀ(R0
i))⊥ ⊂ Ri, which contradicts the fact that
the lineality space Li is the maximal vector subspace contained in Ri.
It is easy to check that Ri =( Ri ∩ L⊥
i )+Li (also see Allouch, Le Van,
and Page (2001)). By Corollary 16.4.2 in Rockafellar (1970), we have
R
0






= {p ∈ L
⊥
i | p.y ≤ 0,∀y ∈ (Ri ∩ L
⊥
i )}. (2)
We notice that the positive dual of Ri ∩ L⊥
i in L⊥
i is also R0
i,a n dt h a t
Ri ∩ L⊥








Then, it follows from (2)
riR
0
i =i n t L⊥
i R
0
i = {p ∈ L
⊥
i | p · y<0,∀y ∈ (Ri ∩ L
⊥
i ) \{ 0}}.
22From (1) of the present lemma, we get Si = −ri(R0
i).
In addition to Lemma 6.2 above, we need the following lemma, a restate-
ment of Corollary 16.2.2 in Rockafellar (1970).
Lemma 6.3 Let f1,...f m be a proper convex functions on Rm.I n o r d e r





1 + ...+ x
∗






















m) > 0, (5)
it is necessary and suﬃcient that
m  
i=1
ri(domfi)  = ∅.
We recall that for a convex function domfi = {x ∈ Rm | fi(x) < +∞}
and f∗






i)=s u p {x
∗
i · x | x ∈ domfi}.
Proof of Theorem 1 (The Equivalence of Hart and Werner)
For every i =1 ,...,m,let
fi(x)=
 









i)=s u p {x
∗
i · x | x ∈ R
0
i}. (6)
Since 0 ∈ R0
i, it follows that f∗
i O+(x∗
i) ≥ 0f o ra l li.T h e n( 4 )i ss a t i s ﬁed
if and only if f∗
i O+(x∗
i)=0f o ra l li and therefore from (6) if and only if
x∗
i ∈ Ri. Quite similarly, (5) is not satisﬁed if and only if −x∗
i ∈ Ri.S i n c e
Li = Ri ∩− Ri, it follows that the ﬁrst assertion of Lemma 6.3 is satisﬁed if












Hence, the equivalence follows from Lemma 6.3.
236.3 Existence
6.3.1 Modifying the economy
Our method of proving existence is new. Our starting point is an exchange
economy E satisfying assumptions [A.1]-[A.2] and weak nonsatiation [A.4]. To
deal with the problem of satiation, we construct a new economy E  in which
agents’ utility functions have been modiﬁed. In the new economy E  agents’
preferences are such that no agent is satiated at a rational allocation. Be-
low, we establish that if the economy E satisﬁes assumptions [A.1]-[A.2] and
weak nonsatiation [A.4], then the modiﬁed economy E  satisﬁes assumptions
[A.1]-[A.2], and global nonsatiation. Moreover, we show that if E satisﬁes
Hart’s condition, then the modiﬁed economy E  also satisﬁes Hart’s condi-
tion. Finally, we show that a quasi-equilibrium for the modiﬁed economy E 
is also a quasi-equilibrium for the original economy E.
Let E =( Xi,u i,e i)m
i=1 be an economy satisfying [A.1]-[A.2], and weak
nonsatiation [A.4]. We begin by modifying agents’ utility functions. Suppose
that for some agent i there exists a satiation point x∗
i ∈ Ai,t h a ti s ,
ui(x
∗
i)= s u p
xi∈Xi
ui(xi).
It follows from weak nonsatiation [A.4] that there exists
ri ∈ O





Using ri we deﬁne the function




ρi(xi)=s u p {β ∈ R+ | (xi − βri) ∈   Pi(x
∗
i)}.




ui(xi)+ρi(xi), if xi is a satiation point,
ui(xi), otherwise.
Claim 6.1 The function ρi is well-deﬁned. Moreover, for all xi ∈   Pi(x∗
i) we
have (xi − ρi(xi)ri) ∈   Pi(x∗
i).
24P r o o fo fC l a i m6 . 1 .L e t
W = {β ∈ R+ | (xi − βri) ∈   Pi(x
∗
i)}.
We ﬁr s tn o t i c et h a t0∈ W.T h u s , ∅  = W ⊂ R+.W e c l a i m t h a t W
is bounded. Suppose the contrary. Then −ri ∈ O+   Pi(x∗
i) and therefore
ri ∈ Li(x∗
i), which contradicts ri ∈   Pi(x∗
i) \ Li(x∗
i). Finally, we have (xi −
ρi(xi)ri) ∈   Pi(x∗
i)s i n c e   Pi(x∗
i)i sc l o s e d .2
Claim 6.2 Let λ ≥ 0. Then
{x ∈   Pi(x
∗
i) | ρ(x) ≥ λ} = {λri} +   Pi(x
∗
i).
P r o o fo fC l a i m6 . 2 . First it is obvious that
{λri} +(  Pi(x
∗
i)) ⊂ {x ∈   Pi(x
∗
i) | ρi(x) ≥ λ}.
Furthermore, let xi ∈ {x ∈   Pi(x∗
i) | ρi(x) ≥ λ}.T h e n ,( xi−ρ(xi)ri) ∈   Pi(x∗
i)
and therefore xi ∈ {λri} +   Pi(x∗
i), since   Pi(x∗
i)i sc o n v e x .2
Claim 6.3 We have supxi∈  Pi(x∗
i ) ρi(xi)=+ ∞.
P r o o fo fC l a i m6 . 3 .I ti so b v i o u st h a t( xi +λri) ∈   Pi(x∗
i), for all λ ≥ 0, since
ri ∈ O+   Pi(x∗
i). Moreover, ρi(xi+λri) ≥ λ. Then, supxi∈  Pi(x∗
i ) ρi(xi)=+ ∞.2
Consider the level set Eλ = {x ∈ Xi | vi(x) ≥ λ}, for every λ ∈ R.
Claim 6.4 The function vi is upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave. More-
over, for all xi ∈   Pi(ei)
O+Evi(xi) =
 
O+   Pi(x∗
i), if xi is a satiation point,
O+   Pi(xi), otherwise.
P r o o fo fC l a i m6 . 4 . The function vi is upper semicontinuous and quasi-
concave if and only if Eλ is closed and convex for all λ ∈ R.
25ﬁrst case. Suppose λ ≤ ui(x∗
i). Then, Eλ = {x ∈ Xi | ui(x) ≥ λ}.T h u s ,
Eλ is closed and convex, since ui is upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave.
second case. Suppose λ >u i(x∗
i). Then
Eλ = {x ∈ Xi | vi(x) ≥ λ}
= {x ∈   Pi(x
∗
i) | ρi(x) ≥ (λ − ui(x
∗
i))}
= {(λ − ui(x
∗
i))ri} +   Pi(x
∗
i).
Thus, Eλ is convex and closed.2
Now, we consider the modiﬁed economy E  =( Xi,v i,e i)i=1....,m.L e t
A









ei and vi(xi) ≥ vi(ei),∀i},
be the set of rational allocations of E .
Claim 6.5 If in addition to satisfying assumptions [A.1]-[A.2], and weak
nonsatiation [A.4], E also satisﬁes weak uniformity [A.3], then the following
statement is true:
If the original economy E satisﬁes Hart’s condition (WNMA),t h e nt h e
modiﬁed economy E  also satisﬁes Hart’s condition.




Since, Li is the maximal subspace in Ri,o n eg e t svi has uniform lineality
space equal to Li. Furthermore,
 m
i=1 yi = 0 with ∀i, yi ∈ O+Evi(ei) implies
that
 m
i=1 yi = 0 with ∀i, yi ∈ Ri.S i n c e E satisﬁes the WNMA condition,
yi ∈ Li, ∀i. Therefore, E  also satisﬁes the WNMA condition .2
Claim 6.6 We have:
(i) The modiﬁed economy E  satisﬁes Global Nonsatiation.
(ii) If (x∗,p ∗) is a quasi-equilibrium of E , then (x∗,p ∗) is a quasi-equilibrium
of E.
26P r o o fo fC l a i m6 . 6 .( i) It follows from Claim 6.3.
(ii)I ti sc l e a rt h a tx∗ ∈ A  ⊂ A.M o r e o v e r , l e t xi ∈ Xi be such that
ui(xi) >u i(x∗
i). Then, x∗
i is not a satiation point and therefore vi(x∗
i)=
ui(x∗
i). Since vi(xi) ≥ ui(xi), it follows that vi(xi) >v i(x∗
i). Since (x∗,p ∗)i s
a quasi-equilibrium of E , we can conclude that p∗ ·xi ≥ p∗ ·ei. Thus, (x∗,p ∗)
is a quasi-equilibrium of E.2
6.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2 (Existence Result)
First, it follows from Claim 6.5 that E  also satisﬁes the WNMA. From Claim
6.6 it is suﬃcient to show that E  has a quasi-equilibrium.
We consider a sequence of truncated economies with consumption sets
X
n
i =   Pi(ei) ∩ L
⊥
i ∩ clB(0,n),
where B(0,n) is the open ball of radius n centered at 0. We choose n large
enough so that ei ∈ B(0,n)f o re a c hi.
Let D = ∩L⊥
i and Π i st h eu n i ts p h e r eo fRl+1.
For (p,q) ∈ (D×R+) ∩ Π, we consider
ϕ
n
i (p,q)={xi ∈ X
n




i (p,q)={xi ∈ ϕ
n
i (p,q) | y ∈   P
n




i (xi)={(1 − λ)xi + λzi | 0 < λ ≤ 1,v i(xi) <v i(zi)a n dzi ∈ X
n
i }.
We have the following result:
Lemma 6.4 For n large enough, ζn
i is upper semicontinuous nonempty,
compact and convex valued, for every i.
First we show that ζn
i (p,q) is nonempty for n large enough.
For n large enough, ei ∈ ϕn
i (p,q). Let   xi be a maximizer of vi on ϕn
i (p,q).
If   P n
i (  xi)=∅, we end the proof, since   xi ∈ ζn
i (p,q). If not, let zi ∈ Xn
i , such
that vi(zi) >v i(  xi). By the very deﬁnition of   xi, we have p · zi >p· ei + q.
Let ti, c o n t a i n e di nt h es e g m e n t[   xi,z i], be such that
p · ti = p · ei + q.
27By quasi-concavity of the utility function, vi(ti) ≥ vi(  xi). By the deﬁnition of
  xi,v i(ti) ≤ vi(  xi). Hence ti is another maximizer of vi on ϕn
i (p,q). We claim
that ti ∈ ζn
i (p,q). Indeed, let z  ∈ Xn
i such that vi(z 
i) >v i(ti). We have
p · z  >p· ei + q. Thus,
∀λ ∈ ]0,1],p· ((1 − λ)ti + λz
 ) >p· ei + q.
Second we show that ζn
i (p,q) is convex valued.
Let x and x  be contained in ζn
i (p,q)a n dl e ty ∈   P n
i (λx +( 1− λ)x )f o r
λ ∈ ]0,1[.
(a) First assume p·x<p·ei+q and p·x  ≤ p·ei+q. If vi(x) >v i(x )t h e n
p·x ≥ p·ei+q,which is a contradiction. Hence vi(x) ≤ vi(x ). If vi(x ) >v i(x),
then p·x  = p·ei+q. Because vi(x ) >v i(x), we have λx+(1−λ)x  ∈   P n
i (x)
which implies that
p · (λx +( 1− λ)x
 ) ≥ p · ei + q,
Thus, we have a contradiction because
p · (λx +( 1− λ)x
 ) <p· ei + q.
Therefore vi(x )=vi(x). But now by quasi-concavity, we have
vi(λx +( 1− λ)x
 ) ≥ vi(x)=vi(x
 ).
If vi(λx +( 1− λ)x ) >v i(x), then
p · (λx +( 1− λ)x
 ) ≥ p · ei + q,
a contradiction as before. Hence,
vi(λx +( 1− λ)x
 )=vi(x)=vi(x
 ).
Let y ∈   P n
i (λx +( 1− λ)x ), i.e., y = α(λx +( 1− λ)x )+( 1− α)z for
some α ∈ [0,1[, and some z ∈ Xn
i such that vi(z) >v i(λx +( 1− λ)x ). We
have the identity
α(λx +( 1− λ)x
 )+( 1− α)z = λ(αx +( 1− α)z)+( 1− λ)(αx
  +( 1− α)z).
But we have, p·(αx+(1−α)z) ≥ p·ei+q, and p·(αx+(1−α)z ) ≥ p·ei+q.
Therefore, p · y ≥ p · ei + q.
28(b) Assume now p · x = p · ei + q and p · x  = p · ei + q. In this case
p · (λx +( 1− λ)x ) ≥ p · ei + q. Let
y = α(λx +( 1− λ)x
 )+( 1− α)z
for some α ∈ [0,1[ and some z ∈ Xn
i such that vi(z) >v i(λx +( 1− λ)x ).
We have
vi(z) >v i(λx +( 1− λ)x
 ) ≥ min{vi(x),v i(x
 )}.
Hence p · z ≥ p · ei + q, and p · y ≥ p · ei + q.
F i n a l l y ,w es h o wt h a tζn













z =( 1− λ)xi + λy,
for λ ∈ ]0,1] and y ∈ Xn
i such that vi(y) >v i(x). By the u.s.c. of vi, for ν
large enough, vi(y) >v i(xν
i). Let
z
ν =( 1− λ)x
ν
i + λy.






ν · ei + q
ν.
Since limν→+∞ zν = z,
p · z ≥ p · ei + q.









i (p,q) − ei)] ×{ −m}.
It is clear that,
∀(p,q) ∈ (D × R+) ∩ Π,∀x ∈ Z
n(p,q),(p,q).x ≤ 0.
We can now apply the Debreu ﬁxed point lemma (see Florenzano and Le
Van (1986)).
29Lemma 6.5 Let P ⊂ R +1 be a convex cone which is not a linear subspace.
Let P 0 and Π denote respectively the polar of P and the unit sphere of R +1.
Let Z be an upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.), nonempty, compact and convex
valued correspondence from P ∩ Π into R +1 such that
∀p ∈ P ∩ Π, ∃z ∈ Z(p) such that p · z ≤ 0.
Then there exists ¯ p ∈ P ∩ Π such that Z(¯ p) ∩ P 0  = ∅.
Thus, it follows from the above lemma that










One can write zn =
 m
i=1 ln
i ,w h e r eln












i ) ∈ A⊥. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, it follows











∗) ∈ (D × R+) ∩ Π.
Since x∗ ∈ A⊥ there exists (li) ∈
 m


















Then, by weak uniformity, [A.3], there exists z⊥
i ∈ Xi∩L⊥
i , such that vi(z⊥
i ) >
vi(x∗
i). For n large enough, z⊥
i ∈ Xn
i , and therefore vi(z⊥
i ) >v i(xn
i )( s i n c evi







n · ei + q
n, for y
n
i =( 1− λ)x
n
i + λzi, λ ∈ ]0,1].
30Let n →∞ . Then
p
∗ · ((1 − λ)x
∗
i + λzi) ≥ p
∗ · ei + q
∗.





∗ · ei + q
∗.












∗ · ei + q
∗,∀i,
since li ∈ Li. Summing over i, one gets q∗ =0 , and p∗ · x ∗
i = p∗ · ei,∀i.
We claim that (x ∗
i ,p ∗) is a quasi-equilibrium of E . Thus, it remains to
check that vi(xi) >v i(x ∗
i ) implies p∗·xi ≥ p∗·ei. For such an xi, let x⊥
i be the
projection of xi on L⊥
i .F o rn large enough, x⊥
i ∈ Xn
i , and vi(x⊥









n · ei + q
n,
which implies p∗ · x⊥
i ≥ p∗ · ei, and therefore p∗ · xi ≥ p∗ · ei.2
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